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Cynics do not have to look far: critical international law has uncovered the ways
in which the forces of colonialism and imperialism have been present in the
international legal system from its foundation to the present. According to David
Kennedy, it is not only cynical use of law by despots but experts, including legal
scholars, that –subtly but surely – enable, reproduce, legalize and legitimize this
international legal system.
With such devastating inferences about not only the state of international law but the
role of legal experts in its reproduction, cynicism about the legal project altogether
might be a natural response. What does not receive the same level of attention,
however, is the effect of critique and cynicism in the real world. I am driven by the
intuition that cynicism about and critique of international law (the former often the
result of the latter) and its workings in scholarship might inadvertently serve to
stabilize and legitimize the status quo. In other words, I want to know how and why
such damning conclusions and assessments are not able to meaningfully change the
very status quo of international law it so powerfully criticizes.
In this post I want to offer some preliminary thoughts on why that might be. Doing
so, I first consider the role of (cynical and critical) legal expertise arguing that not
only law but legal expertise has real distributional consequences. Next, I address the
importance of believing in the possibility of change in that context and finally, I wish
to direct attention to an alternative program eventually calling for a less legalistic
view of real-world problems and solutions.
On the role of experts and critics: Fatalism rather than reform?
The reality of power politics and structural inequality in international relations often
seem external to the work of legal experts, but David Kennedy demonstrates
that experts indeed rule. Experts rule by providing the context for decisions, and
thereby the facts and forces that are understood to impinge on a decision or those
that need to be taken into account. That context, however, is the settled outcome
of background work, and background work consists of the socially constructed
knowledge of experts regarding interests and facts relevant for decision. In short,
also legal experts contribute to the construction of reality and such background
knowledge; the result of which is law’s reproduction of the status quo. And cynics
take that as a given.
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Critics, on the other hand, do their work precisely in order to change the accepted
“mainstream” background knowledge. The problem is, however, as identified in a
collection of critical international law scholarship that ‘critical scholars are largely
unwilling to address the issue of reform or change — whether it is possible, and
upon what basis it might take place. As such, they confine themselves to critiques
of the system and its discursive structures but fail to face the consequences of their
work.’
One such consequence might be that critical work channels resources and energy
including personal time and effort in certain ways (with prestigious appointments with
international institutions, NGO’s and universities along with salaries and other perks)
and redirects them away from other, perhaps more viable, projects.
A deeper problem I identify in my research is a cynicism that may result from
critique. If everything is wrong –for example, the colonial structures still existing in
today’s international law – if yesterday and tomorrow are just like today, investing
energy into action towards a transformative politics seems pointless. In other words,
when the takeaway of international lawyers of institutions like the International
Criminal Court (ICC) is what Thrasymachus says in Plato’s Republic, “everywhere
justice is the same thing, the advantage of the stronger”; or that the (correct) finding
that the UN Security Council (UNSC) was established to institutionalize the outcome
of the Second World War, the inevitable cynical conclusion is that yesterday’s
international law is just as bad as today’s. Any improvements are just distractions,
and all efforts to change the status quo just results in another, more subtle way in
which the status quo constitutes itself.
Instead, we need to believe in the possibility of change.
The Possibility of Change and an Alternative Program: The example of
International Criminal Law
To escape such fatalism, I argue that we need, first, a belief in the possibility
of change and, second, an alternative program. For real change, we need to
first understand that legalism influences our ability to find remedies for existing
(structural) problems. Consider the absence of any mechanism for the prevention
of international crimes. The ICC Statute mentions in its preamble the determination
to prevent such crimes, but nowhere is a mechanism established to fulfill this goal.
The absence of any role for the UNSC to use its coercive powers for the prevention
of international crimes is, of course, symptomatic for the problematic focus of the
law on accountability rather than prevention. Focusing solely on heinous acts
of individuals and prosecuting their crimes is seen as a means to tackling and
mitigating the commission of international crimes. However, this narrows our field of
vision and thus also our sense of possibility. Few international criminal law experts
really understand the root causes for the outbreak of atrocity violence. This is where
I want to offer an alternative program.
Just as human rights law and the rest of international law, international criminal
justice has a tendency to treat only the tips of icebergs. While structural issues and
root causes for atrocity crimes have recently been acknowledged at the UN, armed
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conflict, state and group terrorism and massacres gain much more public attention
than structural causes for these very outbreaks.
An alternative program would thus look into adequate structural prevention. This
can take many forms as it aims at removing root causes.  The existing research
pushes for a broadening of the concept to not only take into account root causes but
also an understanding of the dynamic interaction between the risks posed by root
causes and the locally-based mitigation factors that foster resilience to such risks.
Comparative genocide studies have also identified a range of root causes and risk
factors of social, political and economic dimensions.
In short, more research needs to be done in this area, but it is clear that legal
scholars should play only a very limited role in this, except for the realization that
without pointing to alternatives, law and legal expertise may do more to stabilize
the status quo than to challenge it. It is alluring and tempting to believe that we as
legal scholars are making a difference by uncovering power structures that cause
inequality, but this is not enough. As long as critique is unable to offer alternatives, it
might be cynically used to serve exactly opposite purposes.
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